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Abstract
The Thai government’s decision to allow the baht to float in July 1997 was the pivotal event
of the Asian Financial Crisis. The baht fell 20% by the end of the month, further pressuring
Thai financial institutions that had borrowed heavily in US dollars and other foreign
currencies. In early August, Thailand’s Finance Minister and the Bank of Thailand (BOT)
announced the suspension and restructuring of insolvent finance companies and a blanket
guarantee covering depositors and creditors of all domestic banks and the remaining finance
companies, administered by the BOT’s Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF).
However, the blanket guarantee was initially unsuccessful in restoring public confidence
because of early inconsistencies in messaging and skepticism about the credibility of the
guarantee given the extent of financial institutions’ liabilities. Bank runs continued for
months after the government announced the guarantee and ended only in November, when
the government began to use its new authority to take over insolvent banks and assume their
liabilities, rather than closing them and directly paying guaranteed depositors and creditors.
No guaranteed depositors or creditors lost money after the government announced the
blanket guarantee. The FIDF ultimately lost THB 1.4 trillion (USD 34 billion) in bailing out
guaranteed banks and finance companies, THB 554 billion of which specifically went toward
the blanket guarantee. In 2003, the FIDF reduced the blanket guarantee’s coverage to include
only depositors and no other creditors. The blanket guarantee ended with the enactment of
the Deposit Protection Agency Act in 2008, which established a limited deposit insurance
scheme that protected deposits up to THB 1 million (USD 32,000).
Keywords: Asian Financial Crisis, blanket guarantee, FIDF, Thailand

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering blanket guarantee programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at
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Overview
Thailand and other Southeast Asian
countries experienced an economic boom in
the early 1990s (Corsetti et al 1999). Thai
financial institutions borrowed liberally
from foreign sources, largely in US dollars, to
finance extensive real estate lending.
Thailand’s current-account deficit peaked at
8.5% of its GDP in 1996. This made Thailand
particularly vulnerable to speculative
attacks on its currency (Haksar and
Giorgianni 2000; Sharma 2013).
In 1996, growing numbers of real estate
borrowers began to default on their loans,
pressuring Thai financial institutions. The
Bangkok Bank of Commerce (BBC),
Thailand’s ninth-largest bank, collapsed on
May 10, 1996. This led to the first of many
speculative foreign currency attacks that
year (Sharma 2013).
The BOT expended significant resources
throughout 1996 and 1997 to defend the
baht (Sharma 2013). On June 25, 1997, the
finance minister announced that the
government no longer had the necessary
reserves to continue to defend its currency.
On the same day, news reports revealed that
the government had abandoned its efforts to
support the country’s largest finance
company, Finance One (Corsetti et al 1999).

Key Terms
Purpose: To resolve “the crisis of confidence”
among depositors and creditors (FIDF 1997)
Launch Dates

Authorization:
August 5, 1997;
Announcement:
August 5, 1997

End Date(s)

February 6, 2008

Eligible Institutions

All non-suspended
banks, finance
companies, and foreign
bank branches

Eligible Liabilities

All depositors and
creditors except
subordinated debt
holders and off-balancesheet creditors

Fees

0.3-0.4% of covered
liabilities

Coverage

THB 10.6 trillion

Outcomes

No depositors lost
money; the FIDF
ultimately lost
THB 1.4 trillion in
bailing out covered
financial institutions,
THB 554 billion of
which helped
depositors

On June 26, 1997, the BOT issued 30-day
suspensions, or orders to cease operations, Notable Features
The guarantee covered
principal and interest
to 16 finance companies (including Finance
using local currency, but
One) on the basis of their impaired capital
set caps on the interest
and limited liquidity (Sharma 2013). The
rates
measure failed to stop depositor runs on
other finance companies and small banks, in
part because the Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF), a body within the BOT
concerned with financial health, did not protect depositors and creditors of the suspended
companies. Rather, it exchanged their deposits for promissory notes issued by a state-owned
finance company and allowed other creditors to incur substantial losses (Santiprabhob
2003). Meanwhile, on July 2, 1997, the government allowed the baht to float (IMF 1997a).
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The currency depreciated 20% by the end of July. Both the finance minister and central bank
governor resigned, and the government formally requested support from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) on July 28, 1997 (Boughton 2012; Nabi and Shivakumar 2001).
The new central bank governor promised a blanket guarantee of the principal and interest
for depositors and creditors of all finance companies on August 5, 1997. The guarantee came
with the suspension of an additional 42 troubled finance companies, bringing the total
number of suspended firms to 58 (Koetsawang 1997). The central bank governor assured
that the guarantee was “no lip service” in his August 5 press conference (Dow Jones
Newswires 1997). As such, the board of the FIDF rescinded a previous guarantee on
promissory notes that it had extended to 10 specific banks (Ingsrisawang 1997). The central
bank governor reiterated the government’s commitment to depositors on August 6, urging
the public not to panic (Miller 1997). The assistant bank governor attributed the extension
of the blanket guarantee to discomfort within the central bank with the amount of Thai
deposits being transferred to foreign banks. The amount of withdrawals was reported by the
government to be between THB 15 billion and THB 20 billion per week (McDowell 1997).
On August 7, 1997, the Ministry of Finance announced a blanket guarantee for creditors and
depositors in all banks and the 33 remaining non-suspended finance companies
(Government of Thailand 1997). The guarantee, which the Bank of Thailand Act (BOT Act)
gave the FIDF the power to administer, was extended to assure the public of the solvency of
financial institutions and increase confidence in the stability of the financial system by
protecting depositors and creditors of financial institutions. However, the original guarantee
outlined on August 7, 1997, did not specify the exact liabilities covered, leading to confusion
and doubt among the public about the government’s ability and willingness to honor the
guarantee (FIDF 1997; Nabi and Shivakumar 2001).
Later in August, the IMF agreed to a three-year standby loan agreement worth 2.9 billion
special drawing rights (SDR; about USD 3.9 billion) (IMF 1997b). The blanket guarantee was
a key commitment from the Thai government in exchange for the loan agreement
(Government of Thailand 1997).
Depositors and creditors of the 42 institutions suspended in August 1997, as well as
depositors in finance companies suspended in June 1997, were given the option of
exchanging their claims for fully guaranteed notes from the state-owned banks Krung Thai
Thanakit (KTT) and Krung Thai Bank (KTB) (Minister of Finance and BOT 1997). The FIDF
was responsible for payment of both principal and interest on guaranteed notes (Nabi and
Shivakumar 2001). However, the FIDF capped the amount of interest it would cover to
discourage banks from using the guarantee to compete for deposits with high rates (FIDF
1997). Figure 1 details the different forms of protection and the financial institutions which
it covered.
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Figure 1: Coverage by Institution Type
Financial Institution Status

Type of Coverage

Institutions suspended on June 16, 1997

Depositors eligible for note exchange scheme;
creditors not covered

Institutions suspended on August 5, 1997

Depositors and creditors eligible for note
exchange scheme

Remaining institutions

Depositors and creditors covered by FIDF
blanket guarantee

Source: Author’s analysis.

Runs continued on small banks and finance companies despite the announcement of the
blanket guarantee (Santiprabhob 2003). A government decree on October 25, 1997,
amended the BOT Act to allow the FIDF to draw funds directly from the government. The
decree specified depositors and creditors that were eligible for the blanket guarantee. The
guarantee did not cover subordinated debt holders, off-balance-sheet creditors, and
shareholders’ funds (Emergency Decree B.E. 2485 1997; Government of Thailand 1997, box
1).
The October legislation created a new agency to take control of insolvent financial
institutions and assume their liabilities (Emergency Decree B.E. 2540 1997). Under the
previous laws, the FIDF’s only option was to liquidate a financial institution and directly pay
guaranteed depositors and creditors. With the new legislation, the FIDF could avoid such
direct payouts by taking over an institution, reselling it or merging it with another
institution, and using government resources to fill any gap between the value of its assets
and the liabilities owed to depositors and other guaranteed creditors. The FIDF’s first such
intervention was in the Bangkok Metropolitan Bank (BMB), the ninth-largest bank at that
time, in November 1997:
That intervention was a major shift in approach from the previous method of
suspending and closing insolvent Fls. Under the intervention approach, the bank,
pending a decision on its future, was allowed to service its depositors and debtors as
normal, thereby minimizing the impact on the real economy and preventing the
government from compensating depositors and creditors outright under the blanket
guarantee. (Santiprabhob 2003, 17)
The government thus avoided paying depositors directly under the blanket guarantee by
taking control of insolvent financial institutions. The FIDF incurred significant expenses from
its various crisis responses, accumulating THB 1.4 trillion in debt (USD 34 billion) to cover
losses.3 Of this total, THB 554.1 billion was specifically used to help guaranteed depositors

3

In June 2002, USD 1 was equivalent to THB 41.58 (per Federal Reserve).
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(BOT n.d.a; BOT n.d.b). By 2015, the FIDF was liable for approximately THB 1 trillion of this
debt (Sangwongwanich 2015).
Though no end date was set for the blanket guarantee, the IMF rescue package included a
stated goal of creating a more limited deposit insurance program once the economic
situation had stabilized and the system had been restructured. Authorities said in 1999 that
they would try to incentivize banks and other finance companies to exit the guarantee by
making it voluntary, but they ultimately never made that change. Rather, in 2003, the FIDF
reduced the blanket guarantee’s coverage to include only depositors and not creditors. The
FIDF guarantee officially ended when the Deposit Protection Agency Act, enacted on
February 6, 2008, installed a limited deposit insurance program that covered deposits up to
THB 1 million (about USD 31,817)4 (BOT n.d.b; Deposit Protection Agency Act 2008).
Summary Evaluation
The Thai government enacted the FIDF guarantee to restore public confidence in the
soundness of the financial system following the suspension of 58 of its 91 finance companies
(FIDF 1997; Government of Thailand 1997). A 2001 World Bank report concluded that the
guarantee and other government measures were unsuccessful in this task, as market
confidence continued to deteriorate into 1998. The Thai government struggled to restore
public confidence because of the size of liabilities the program covered and inconsistencies
in government messaging. Limited deposit runs continued even after the announcement of
the blanket guarantee. The mechanism for funding and executing the guarantee as well as
handling suspended institutions was also unclear. It took considerable time to establish the
framework for handling suspended institutions because of the slow progress of
parliamentary measures (Nabi and Shivakumar 2001; Santiprabhob 2003).
The public viewed the government’s June 1997 announcement about the first 16 finance
company suspensions as non-transparent, according to Veerathai Santiprabhob, an IMF
official during the crisis who later became the central bank governor. He said in a 2003 paper
that the BOT did not publicly disclose the criteria used to decide which institutions were
suspended, leading to skepticism over the strength of the institutions that remained. The
August suspension was more successful in slowing deposit runs among the remaining
financial institutions because the government announced the blanket guarantee in the same
announcement and because it said it would protect some types of creditors of suspended
institutions that it had not protected in the first round of suspensions (Santiprabhob 2003).
The Bangkok Post reported a major policy reversal on August 5, 1997, in which the
government rescinded its original promise to guarantee promissory notes issued by 10 weak
finance firms. This policy change followed changes in the leadership of both the BOT and
MOF (Ingsrisawang 1997).
Only with the legislation of October 1997 did the government have the authority to take over
and resolve insolvent financial institutions, rather than closing them and directly paying
4

In February 2008, USD 1 was equivalent to THB 31.43 (per Federal Reserve).
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guaranteed depositors and creditors. In November 1997, the BOT used that authority to take
control of the Bangkok Metropolitan Bank (BMB) after it showed signs of weakness. Rather
than suspend the bank’s operations, Thai authorities allowed the bank to continue to service
its depositors and creditors. This demonstration of their ability to intervene without hurting
depositors helped stop the deposit runs and strengthened the public’s confidence in the
blanket guarantee. Santiprabhob suggests that if this intervention approach had been
instituted alongside the blanket guarantee sooner, it could have lessened the severity of the
crisis. The World Bank report suggested that a royal decree would have accelerated the
process but may also have triggered a parliamentary vote of no confidence given the fragile
political climate (Nabi and Shivakumar 2001; Santiprabhob 2003).
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: Thai authorities extended the blanket guarantee to assure the public
about the soundness of commercial banks and remaining finance companies when
it closed 58 troubled finance companies.
The BOT suspended 16 finance companies in June 1997 and 42 more in August 1997. At the
time of the second suspension, Thai authorities extended a blanket guarantee to depositors
and creditors of all banks and the remaining finance companies to assure the public about
the soundness of the rest of the financial system (FIDF 1997). Thai depositors were
continuously transferring funds into larger institutions and foreign banks during this period.
Thai authorities feared that this flight to quality would cause otherwise healthy finance
companies to become unstable. At the time the guarantee was announced, the government
reported that weekly withdrawals totaled between THB 15 billion and THB 20 billion per
week (McDowell 1997; Sherer 1997).
2. Part of a Package: The guarantee was released as one piece of a broader IMFbacked effort to restore stability to the Thai financial system.
The Thai government announced that it was pursuing an IMF agreement on July 28, 1997,
following the resignation of the central bank governor and finance minister. The new central
bank governor announced the blanket guarantee for depositors and creditors on August 5,
1997, alongside the announcement by the new finance minister of the suspension of 42
finance companies (Boughton 2012; Dow Jones Newswires 1997).
In an August 14, 1997, letter of intent to the IMF, the Thai government committed to a
Financial Restructuring Program to restore public confidence in the financial system. The
blanket guarantee was a central part of that program. The program also included the
isolation of the weakest institutions, through suspension and restructuring; an institutional
framework for restructuring the financial system; and reforms to improve the efficiency,
profitability, and solvency of the system. The IMF approved the rescue package on August
20, 1997. The package also included fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies intended to
prevent the flow of capital out of the country and establish a fiscal surplus (Government of
Thailand 1997; Nabi and Shivakumar 2001).
3. Legal Authority: The Prime Minister signed emergency decrees giving the BOT the
power to take over and restructure insolvent financial institutions and amending
the Bank of Thailand Act to enable the FIDF to draw funds directly from the
government to fully guarantee depositors and creditors.
The BOT Act established the FIDF to reconstruct and develop the financial system to accord
it strength and stability. From the original passing of the BOT Act, the FIDF had the legal
authority to extend guarantees with the condition of charging all covered institutions a fee
(BOT 2018, ch. 5). On October 22, Thailand’s prime minister signed an emergency decree
amending the Bank of Thailand Act. The decree, which Parliament passed a few days later,
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empowered the FIDF to draw funds directly from the government, giving more credibility to
the blanket guarantee (Emergency Decree B.E. 2485 1997; Nabi and Shivakumar 2001).
Also on October 22, the Emergency Decree on Financial Sector Restructuring established the
framework for handling suspended institutions (Emergency Decree B.E. 2540 1997). The
prime minister signed a decree amending the Commercial Banking and Finance Companies
Acts to provide new legal powers to the BOT (Emergency Decree B.E. 2505 1997). The
amendments gave the BOT more control over financial institutions to change their
management. It also empowered the BOT to write down the value of closed institutions’
shares in order to protect depositors and creditors (FIDF 1997; Government of Thailand
1997, box 1; Sutham 1997).
4. Administration: The FIDF administered the guarantee.
The FIDF administered the guarantee. The BOT Act empowered the FIDF to administer
guarantees (BOT 2018, ch. 5). The program did not require any form of application and the
eligible liabilities of all remaining institutions were immediately covered in full (FIDF 1997).5
5. Governance: The Finance Minister appointed the committee that oversaw the FIDF.
A five-to-nine-member Fund Management Committee oversaw the FIDF. The finance
minister appointed the members of this committee. The governor of the BOT served as the
chairman of the committee, and the committee appointed an officer of the BOT to serve as
the manager of the FIDF. The FIDF’s accounts were audited annually by the Office of the
Auditor-General. The auditor presented an audit report to the Finance Minister and sent a
copy to the BOT (BOT 2018, ch. 5).
The Finance Minister, BOT, and Fund Management Committee established a set of criteria to
monitor quantitative performance, indicative targets, and structural performance of
financial institutions in order to monitor the effectiveness of the Financial Restructuring
Program (Government of Thailand 1997).
The BOT and Minister of Finance resolved to improve transparency to help market
participants make informed economic decisions. Starting on August 29, 1997, the BOT
committed to publishing data on the key elements of its assets and liabilities on a fortnightly
basis. The BOT also worked closely with financial institutions and regulatory bodies to
ensure the publishing of “regular and comprehensive data on their financial condition.”
Finally, the BOT and Finance Minister reviewed the FIDF’s Special Dissemination Standards
to achieve greater efficiency and transparency (Government of Thailand 1997).

The KTT and KTB oversaw the note exchange scheme for eligible claimants in suspended institutions. The
FIDF was responsible for compensation of all depositors and creditors (Nabi and Shivakumar 2001).
5
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6. Communication: The Bank of Thailand said that the guarantee was meant to
restore confidence in the financial system.
On July 28, 1997, the Thai government announced that it was seeking support from the IMF
(Nabi and Shivakumar 2001). The central bank governor assured that depositors and
creditors would be protected during a press conference on August 5 (Dow Jones Newswires
1997). The Finance Minister officially announced the blanket guarantee on paper on August
7, 1997 (FIDF 1997). On August 14, 1997, Thailand submitted a letter of intent to the IMF
detailing its plan for crisis response, of which the blanket guarantee was a part (Government
of Thailand 1997). On August 20, 1997, the IMF officially announced the three-year standby
loan agreement extended to Thailand (IMF 1997b).
The public did not respond as intended to the communication of the blanket guarantee, and
market confidence continued to falter. The public was not entirely certain of the extent of
guarantees and which liabilities were covered. This led to a lack of confidence in the
credibility of the blanket guarantee (Nabi and Shivakumar 2001; Sharma 2013).
7. Source(s) and Size of Funding: The government funded the blanket guarantee
through borrowing and fees charged to covered financial institutions.
The August 7, 1997, announcement of the blanket guarantee stated that it was financed by
“borrowing and bond issuance with government guarantee” (FIDF 1997). The FIDF also said
that fees charged to covered financial institutions would play a part in the funding of the
blanket guarantee (see Fees section).
To give additional credibility to the guarantee, the prime minister amended the Bank of
Thailand Act in October 1997 using an emergency decree to allow the FIDF to draw funds
directly from the government (Emergency Decree B.E. 2485 1997).
Though the blanket guarantee was included in the language of the letter of intent that
Thailand submitted to the IMF, the resulting standby loan was not used to fund the blanket
guarantee in any part (IMF 1997b).
The FIDF ultimately accumulated THB 1.4 trillion (USD 34 billion) in debt to cover its losses
from bailing out guaranteed banks and finance companies. Of that total, THB 554.1 billion
helped depositors protected by the blanket guarantee (BOT n.d.a).
8. Eligible Institutions: The full guarantee covered all banks and non-suspended
finance companies.
The blanket guarantee announced on August 7, 1997, was extended to creditors and
depositors in all operating financial institutions (FIDF 1997). This originally applied to all
operating financial institutions following the suspensions on August 5, 1997. The only
requirement was the payment of a fee based upon the value of covered assets (BOT 2018, ch.
5).
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The August 14, 1997, letter of intent introduced a scheme to exchange claims on suspended
banks with notes issued by state-owned banks KTB and KTT that the FIDF guaranteed6
(Government of Thailand 1997, box 1).
9. Eligible Liabilities: The guarantee covered principal and interest on all deposits
and non-subordinated liabilities, but there were caps on the amount of interest it
covered.
The August 1997 announcement of the rescue package extended a guarantee covering all
deposits and non-subordinated liabilities in all operating financial institutions following the
second round of suspensions of August 5, 1997 (Government of Thailand 1997; Haksar and
Giorgianni 2000). Depositors and creditors in all operating financial institutions were fully
protected by the FIDF (FIDF 1997).
The FIDF was responsible for covering the full principal amount for accounts in all nonsuspended institutions (Government of Thailand 1997, box 1). However, the responsibility
for covering interest payments varied. For depositors in commercial banks, the FIDF covered
interest up to a maximum rate of the average three-month fixed rate offered by the five
largest commercial banks plus 300 basis points (FIDF 1997). In September 2007, the BOT
imposed this cap on all commercial bank deposits (BOT 1999).
For depositors in all other types of financial institution, the FIDF covered interest up to a
maximum rate of the five largest banks’ average three-month fixed rate plus 600 basis points.
For creditors in all types of financial institution, the FIDF covered interest as specified in the
contracts up to a maximum rate not exceeding the average minimum lending rate of the five
largest commercial banks, minus 400 basis points (FIDF 1997).
On October 25, 1997, the government’s emergency decree on Financial Sector Restructuring
defined depositors and creditors and specified that the blanket guarantee excluded
subordinated debt, off-balance-sheet creditors, and shareholders’ funds (Government of
Thailand 1997, box 1). The emergency decree defined depositors to include “holders of
negotiable certificate of deposit and promissory notes issued to borrow or receive money
from the public” (Emergency Decree B.E. 2485 1997, 3). Creditors were defined to include
creditors other than depositors, “whose creditor status arose from the financial institution .
. . lending, purchasing of promissory note or holding of other debt instruments where the
financial institution is the borrower, payer or issuer” (Emergency Decree B.E. 2485 1997, 3).
The FIDF limited its coverage to depositors in 2003 (BOT n.d.b).

For the 42 institutions that were suspended on August 5, 1997, both depositors and creditors had access to
the note exchange scheme. For the 16 finance companies suspended on June 26, 1997, only depositors had
access to the note exchange scheme (Government of Thailand 1997, box 1).
6

310

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 4

10. Fees: Member institutions were charged a percentage of the total value of their
covered liabilities.
The BOT Act required covered institutions to make contributions to the FIDF while covered
by a guarantee. This contribution amounted to a percentage of each financial institution’s
covered liabilities (BOT 2018, ch. 5). The FIDF collected the fees on a semi-annual basis.
According to the letter of intent that the government signed with the IMF, the rate was 0.15%
in December 1997 and 0.20% in June 1998 and December 1998 (Government of Thailand
1997, box 1). These fees were a part of the funding for the blanket guarantee (FIDF 1997).
11. Process for Exercising Guarantee: In the event of insolvency, the FIDF would honor
the claims of creditors and depositors in baht within 30 days.
The FIDF stated that in the event of a firm’s insolvency, depositors and creditors covered by
the guarantee would be compensated within 30 days of the submission of claims, in baht
(FIDF 1997; Government of Thailand 1997).
12. Other Restrictions: The BOT instituted a temporary deposit rate cap for member
institutions, set limits on foreign borrowing, required companies to raise capital,
and increased monitoring and oversight.
The Thai government, in its letter of intent, outlined several measures to prevent potential
moral hazard among covered financial institutions. The first of these measures, in September
2007, was a temporary deposit rate cap of 300 basis points above the average deposit rate
of the five largest commercial banks. In June, the BOT had temporarily set a ceiling of 12%
on saving deposits, with separate guidelines for finance companies; it raised the cap to 14%
in July. The FIDF also took steps to monitor and limit foreign borrowing and strengthened
its monitoring of asset growth and general oversight (BOT 1999; Government of Thailand
1997).
All covered financial institutions were required to raise their capital. The government
waived previous limits on foreign ownership to encourage banks to seek foreign
participation (Government of Thailand 1997, box 1). Undercapitalized institutions that could
not raise their capital were taken over by the FIDF (BOT 1999).
13. Duration: The government did not originally identify an end date for the
guarantee.
The government did not originally identify an end date for the blanket guarantee. In 1997,
authorities stated that they would replace the guarantee with a limited deposit insurance
scheme following the stabilization and restructuring of the financial system. Authorities set
a goal of incentivizing exit from the guarantee by 1999 through increased fees or making
participation voluntary, although they did not follow through on those goals. The FIDF
limited its coverage to depositors in 2003 (BOT n.d.b; Government of Thailand 1997).
Deposit insurance was enacted on February 6, 2008, with the passage of the Deposit
Protection Agency Act, at which time the blanket guarantee effectively ended. The new
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limited deposit insurance scheme covered deposits up to THB 1 million (Deposit Protection
Agency Act 2008).
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